Wednesday, April 05, 2006

The difference between Griswold and Roe

In the 1965 case of Griswold v. Connecticut, the staff of a Planned Parenthood clinic argued that a State anti-contraception statute was unconstitutional, in that it violated the doctors' right to freedom of speech in giving advice to patients, and the due process rights of women to privacy in marriage. Eight years later, Sarah Weddington used the ruling here to extend the right of privacy to those wishing to end the lives of their unborn children. However, toward the end of the second day of oral arguments, counsel for the Appellants in Griswold explained how abortion laws were different.

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Estelle T. Griswold, et al., v. Connecticut


Transcript of Oral Arguments before the Supreme Court of the United States

Washington, D.C.
Tuesday, March 30, 1965

Thomas I. Emerson, Esq., for the Appellants

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THE COURT: Would your argument concerning these things you've been talking about relating to privacy, invalidate all laws that punish people for bringing about abortions?

MR. EMERSON: No, I think it would not cover the abortion laws Or the sterilization laws, Your Honor. Those--that conduct does not occur in the privacy of the home.

THE COURT: There is some privacy, as a rule, and the individual doesn't generally want it made known.

MR. EMERSON: Well, that aspect of it is true, Your Honor. But those are offenses which do not involve the type of enforcement apparatus as to what goes on in the home that this--

THE COURT: Part of it goes on in the home, undoubtedly.

MR. EMERSON: Part of it does, Your Honor. But the conduct that is being prohibited in the abortion cases takes place outside of the home, normally. There is no violation of the sanctity of the home.

THE COURT: Well, apart from that, Mr. Emerson, I take it abortion involves a life in being, doesn't it? Isn't that a rather different problem from contraception?

MR. EMERSON: Oh, yes, of course.

THE COURT: And isn't it different in the sense of the State's power to deal with it?

MR. EMERSON: Oh, yes. Of course, the substantive offense is quite different here.

THE COURT: Are you saying that all abortions involve k.lling, or murd.r?

MR. EMERSON: Well I don't know whether you need characterize it that way. But it involves taking what has begun to be a life.

THE COURT: But the State thinks each of them is wrong, and it passes a law to forbid it being done. It relates to a pretty closely analogous situation.

MR. EMERSON: Yes, Your Honor. But that case is different from this situation because in the abortion cases Connecticut does not apply this moral principle. It is the use of an instrument to prevent birth taking place. But they do not apply the moral principle that it can never be done. In Connecticut, abortion is allowed where it is necessary to save the life of the mother or the child. So that the basic moral principle that Connecticut is trying to enforce here, they simply pay no attention to in their abortion laws. It's a completely inconsistent application of the principle. They don't take it seriously in the abortion cases, only in contraception cases.

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